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EXCOM 82-7018  
17 May 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members

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[REDACTED]

Executive Assistant to the Executive Director

SUBJECT:

Minutes of 7 May 1982 Executive Committee Meeting: Long-Range Planning (Phase II): Counterintelligence; Covert Action

1. The Executive Committee met on 7 May to review the Phase II long-range planning paper on counterintelligence and the revised paper on covert action. Mr. McMahon (ExDir) chaired the session; participants included Messrs. Dirks (DDS&T); Fitzwater (DDA); Gates (DDI); George (A/DDO); Lipton (Compt); [REDACTED] (IG); Glerum (D/OP), and Sporkin (GC).

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2. Counterintelligence: [REDACTED] (CI Staff) highlighted the counterintelligence paper, noting that the drafters had used the traditional definition of counterintelligence—countering human espionage targeted against the United States—and excluded terrorism and narcotics from consideration. He noted that the Soviet Union was expected to remain the prime threat to the United States, but acknowledged the counterintelligence threat from the Third World and our allies could increase somewhat. He also pointed out the increased awareness of the threat presented by technology transfer.

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3. [REDACTED] reported that the Agency's current counterintelligence effort was generally adequate. Better training and some shifts in resource allocation should suffice for the time period being considered. Some increased resources might be necessary for technical equipment and computer support.

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4. Committee discussion of the paper focused primarily on the adequacy of the traditional definition of counterintelligence for long-range planning purposes. Messrs. Dirks and McMahon questioned excluding SIGINT and imagery. Mr. Fitzwater suggested that computer, communications, personnel, and physical security should all be included. Mr. Gates said that he found the traditional definition of counterintelligence inadequate and suggested a number of areas that should be analyzed, including foreign intelligence services' collection capabilities, damage assessments of compromised intelligence (e.g., Boyce/Lee) and foreign deception efforts. He noted that because of a general perception that not enough was being done in counterintelligence, the Community was under considerable outside pressure to do more. Mr. George acknowledged recent concerns about doing more "multidisciplinary" counterintelligence analysis, but said that so far no one has defined what that means. Mr. Gates said that the DDI has not provided DDO much help in this area, but steps were being taken to provide some analytical support on topics like those he had mentioned earlier.

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5. Messrs. Lipton and [REDACTED] endorsed expanding the paper. [REDACTED] also expressed concern about selecting officers to serve on the CI Staff, noting the difficulty in attracting good people. Mr. McMahon agreed with Mr. Sporkin's suggestion that the

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division of labor between CIA and the FBI should be mentioned in the paper. Mr. Gates noted that because various elements of the Agency's counterintelligence effort were so decentralized, there should be some point that serves as a coordination mechanism to ensure that all facets of the effort are working together.

25X1 6. After additional discussion, Mr. McMahon asked the DDA to develop a contribution to the paper that would address personnel, computer, communications, and physical security concerns. The DDI and DDS&T should develop a paper covering imagery, SIGINT and analytical concerns. [ ] is then to integrate these into an expanded counterintelligence planning paper. The resource estimates should be revised to reflect this broader scope. [ ] should also ensure that this paper serves as the basis for the Agency's input to the ongoing Community study on counterintelligence. At Mr. Dirks' suggestion, Mr. Gates is to determine if DIA is still charged with tracking Soviet satellite collection efforts against this country.

25X1 7. Covert Action: Committee members generally endorsed the revised version of the covert action planning paper. [ ] (C/IAD) said that in response to Committee member suggestions, he would be adding two or three items, like OPEC, to the core issues of continuing importance. Mr. McMahon suggested that the paper should emphasize that while the DDI's intelligence needs paper focused on a number of areas, the main focus of covert action will remain the Soviet Union.

8. The meeting was adjourned.



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